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*

Tim most common human

stupidity, Nietzsche observed, is
to forget what one is trying to do. Regrettably, this has
often been the case of voluminous proposals for reform of our
juvenile court laws. 1 Law is a means to an end. The pri* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.

'The most recent well-considered local proposals for reform deal with
youths from 16 to 21. At present, two state-wide statutes and one statute
operative in three counties make special provision for these adolescents.
(A) Under the Youthful Offender Act (N.Y. CoDE Cims. Paoc. §§ 913-e913-r), enacted in 1944, an offender from 16 through 18 at the time of the
commission of a crime, who has not previously been convicted of a felony and
who is not charged with a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment may,
with his consent, be investigated to determine whether he should be given the
specialized treatment and status known as "Youthful Offender," or whether
he should be handled as an adult criminal. The decision is made by the judge
of the trial court to which the youth is brought. Such youthful offender procedure may be initiated by the grand jury, the district attorney or the judge's
own motion, but it does not occur until after the youth reaches the trial court.
If he is found eligible for youthful offender treatment, the charge of "Youthful
Offender" is substituted for the criminal charge against him, and the indictment or information on the original criminal charge is sealed. Upon a plea of
guilty, or upon being found guilty after a non-jury trial to determine whether
he committed the criminal acts originally charged, the youth is adjudicated a
youthful offender and thus avoids the stigma of a criminal record. As such
he may be committed for an indefinite term up to three years, or he may
receive a suspended sentence involving a three to five-year period of probation.
He may be committed to a public or private reformative institution, but not
to a prison.
(B) Under the Wayward Minor Act (N.Y. CODE CIM. PRoc. §§ 913-a913-d), a minor over 16 and under 21 who conducts himself in such a manner
as to endanger his own health and morals or those of his family or the community, but is not charged with the commission of a crime, may, upon the
complaint of a parent, police officer or other interested person, be adjudicated
a wayward minor by a magistrate other than a justice of the peace. Pursuant
to such adjudication, wayward minors may be placed on probation for a period
not to exceed two years, or committed to a public or private reformative institution for an indeterminate period not to exceed three years. A wayward
minor adjudication is not a conviction of a crime.
(C) The Adolescent Court procedure is permitted only in the counties
of Kings, Queens and Richmond. Under it the Adolescent Court of the Mag-
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mary end of laws affecting young offenders is prevention of

offenses by young persons. Juvenile court laws are good or
bad in proportion as they serve or disserve that end. If this
is so, then official programs in this field cannot be justified
merely because they provide jobs for guidance personnel,
social case workers and probation officers. Neither can they
be defended simply because they offer suitable subjects for
grants from munificent foundations, or timely topics for
businessmen at Rotary luncheons, or for public-spirited

women at afternoon teas.

If such laws are to be properly

evaluated, it may mean that progress is not always synonymous with lenient non-punitive treatment of offenders, and at
the same time that reactionary retrogress may not always be
identified with painful, punitive proposals. If such laws are

worthwhile at all, it is only because they are a means to the
attainment of the worthwhile end of preventing crime and

delinquency among young persons.
istrates' Courts of the City of New York is given power to dismiss, with the
consent of the district attorney, a criminal information or complaint against
a youth between the ages of 16 and 19 and to treat him in accordance with
the procedures governing wayward minors. This procedure takes place early
in the case when, after a preliminary hearing to determine whether probable
cause exists to substantiate the criminal charge, the outh is temporarily released or remanded to custody pending investigation by probation authorities
of his suitability for possible wayward minor treatment. If found suitable,
the youth is adjudicated a wayward minor and is treated as such. Such adjudication, unlike that of "Youthful Offender," does not involve any finding that
the youth committed the criminal acts originally charged. Special treatment
is also given to adolescent narcotic addicts who may be voluntarily committed
to hospitals or institutions for special treatment or who may be adjudged by
a magistrate to be wayward minors.
The proposed changes would: (1) establish a single Youth Court presided
over by a county court judge in each county; (2) extend jurisdiction over
offenders aged 16 to 21 charged with a crime not punishable by death or life
imprisonment and not previously convicted of a 'felony, as well as over wayward minors and adolescent drug users (this would extend youthful offender
treatment to 19 and 20 year-old offenders) ; (3) remove the stigma of criminal
arrest from such youths aged 16 and 17 who are taken into custody and charged
with such crimes; (4) make unnecessary an indictment by a grand jury for
felonies in such cases unless the youth wishes to have his case presented to the
grand jury; (5) increase by two years the present maximum indefinite term
of three years for institutional treatment. In addition, new institutional facilities of the "minimum security" type, such as reforestation camps and the
small, familiar British-type hostel or foster homes, are provided for. For
probationary treatment, provisions for scholarships, teachers of this work and
a 50 per cent increase in personnel are recommended. See 1955 LaG. Doc.
No. 45, REPORT, N.Y. TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE CouRTs 48-59, 68-117
(1955); N.Y. SEN. INT. 2512, 2514-2517 (Feb. 22, 1955).
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CIRCUMSCRIBED CONTROL OF CONDUCT BY CRIMINAL LAW

The fearful limitation of law and its sanctions as a means
of influencing human behavior ought to be fully appreciated.
The criminal law with all its centuries of experience has not
yet been able to build character, or develop desirable habits,
attitudes, interests and ideals. In this respect, a criminal
code must always offer feeble competition to moral influences
of home and community and familiar ethical effects of church
and school.
Juvenile laws can affect juvenile behavior only by the
manner in which they actually impinge upon juveniles who
commit crimes. This influence makes itself felt by (1) subjecting actual offenders to unpleasant treatment in the hope
(often in vain) that its memory will intimidate them from
offending again; (2) treating actual offenders so that potential ones will be dissuaded by that example; (3) restraining
those most likely to commit crimes; and (4) rehabilitating
corrigible offenders.
USE AND ABUSE OF PUNISHMENT

Men seek pleasure, avoid pain. The efficacy of punishment in intimidating actual offenders and deterring potential
ones depends on its certainty of infliction and its intensity.
It has taken many centuries of brutal experience to demonstrate that certainty of punishment is more effective in preventing crime than severity. During the reign of Henry
VIII, 72,000 persons were executed for robbery and theft
alone. This was an average of 2,000 per year in a population
considerably less than three million. Even as late as 1819
in England, the death penalty was available for no fewer than
220 offenses. Proposed reforms met with vigorous opposition. When in 1814 a man was executed for cutting down a
cherry tree, the judge observed that anyone who would maliciously cut down a tree would kill a man. When it was proposed to abolish the death penalty for stealing five shillings
from a dwelling house, the Lord Chancellor and the Chancellor of the Exchequer expressed profound regret. Even Sir
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Robert Peel considered this "a most dangerous experiment."
And Lord Ellenborough, Chief Justice of the King's Bench,
warned, "If we suffer this Bill to pass, we shall not know
where we stand-we shall not know whether we are upon our
heads or our feet." It was emphasized that severity of punishment was the single most important threat to the potential offender. Yet even at public executions, at a time when
picking pockets was punishable by death, pickpockets plied
their trade among the crowd gazing upward at the hangman's
noose, "for they accounted executions their best harvest."
The argument of Sir Samuel Romilly in the House of Commons that certainty, and not severity, of punishment was the
important ingredient in deterrence, finally succeeded in abolition of brutal punishment for petty crime, only because the
establishment of a police force in London in 1829 made that
2
certainty a concrete reality.
The limits of the effective use of punishment, however
certain, must be appreciated. It is one thing to inflict punishment for its own sadistic sake as, for example, in vengeance,
expiation or retribution. It is another to employ it as a
means of influencing human behavior by intimidating actual
law-breakers and deterring potential ones in order to prevent
crime and delinquency. Under numerous varying conditions,
punitive treatment may not be feasible. If such punishment
involves, for example, hanging a 9 year-old boy, as it did in
1488, or executing an 11 year-old one, as was the case two centuries earlier, nullification will shut down the criminal law
machinery.3 This is so because laymen-as complainants,
witnesses and jurors-refuse to participate in the enforcement of such drastic penalties. At the same time, prolonged
and painful institutional confinement is likely to result in the
return to society of embittered and vengeful individuals.
And there is a limit to the cost any community can bear in
institutionalizing everyone found to have committed a crime.
2 See REPORT, SELECT COMMITTEE
(H.M. Stationery Office, 1930).

ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

9, 31-35, 44

3 See cases collected in Ludwig, Delinquent Parents and the Criminal Law,
L. RE,. 719, 722 (1952), and Rationale of Responsibility for Young
Offenders, 29 NEB. L. REv. 521, 527 (1950).

5

VAND.
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LIMITAm ONS OF LNIwNCY

The optimum method of preventing crime and delinquency is, of course, to rehabilitate and reform the young
offender. In so far as such a program involves some temporary restraint upon the offender, it inflicts a certain amount
of pain. Its avowed purpose, however, is to prevent crime by
a process of non-punitive re-education that will somehow
transform a law-breaking youth into a law-observing one.
There has been no large scale demonstration that our present
knowledge makes possible exclusive reliance upon this nonpunitive method of preventing delinquency. A generation ago,
the Boston juvenile court cooperated with the celebrated
Children's Clinic in that city in the cases of a thousand young
offenders, whose average age was between 13 and 14. The
Clinic made a scientific study of the treatment needs of these
youngsters. They recommended which children should be
left in their own homes on probationary oversight, and which
placed in foster homes, or with relatives, or on a farm, or
in a non-correctional institution. Five years later a study
was made to determine what became of these scientifically
treated young delinquents. Of the 923 boys about whose subsequent careers reliable information was available, 88.2 percent had committed crimes again, and 70 percent of these had
committed serious crimes. Here we had Cabot, evidently one
of the wisest and most enlightened of juvenile court judges,
and Healey and Bronner, the most experienced and distinguished clinicians in the field of juvenile delinquency, pooling
their wisdom and knowledge and vast experience in the effort
to reform delinquents, with the net result that 88.2 percent
continued delinquent, and 11.8 percent did not. Both they
and we are utterly unable to explain the result. We do4 not
know why the failures failed or the successes succeeded.
One obstacle yet to be overcome in developing a workable
program of rehabilitation is lack of reliable criteria to differentiate corrigible offenders from incorrigible ones. Take the
4 See GLUECK AND GLUFCE, ONE THOUSAND JUVENILE DELINQUENTS
(1934); Michael, Book Review, 44 YALE LJ. 908 (1935).
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case of Abe "Kid Twist" Reles. This cruel, sadistic slugger
from the Brownsville section of Brooklyn began his criminal
career in 1920 when he was just 13 with an arrest for juvenile
delinquency. He was accorded the usual lenient treatment
on that and numerous subsequent occasions. All told he was
to be arrested 43 times during a career that included a stint
with Murder, Incorporated. Before he mysteriously strode
out of an upper-story window of the Half-Moon Hotel in
Coney Island, he had confessed to no fewer than 18 murders.
It would be more than a mild understatement to indicate that
this is the case history of an incorrigible offender upon whom
non-punitive rehabilitative measures were a waste of community resources.
Again, even if we could separate corrigible from incorrigible offenders, it is not yet possible to determine at what
point the corrigible ones may be pronounced "cured" and in
need of no further reformative treatment.
YOUTH AND CRIME9

The bulk of major crimes by minors are committed by
the upper adolescent age group. With few exceptions, the
Uniform Crime Reports confirm annually that upper adolescent ages predominate in the frequency of arrests.5 Numerous studies substantiate this." In 1953, 8,400 persons
between 16 and 21 were arrested for major crimes in New
York. This was 26.7 percent of the total major crime arrests
5 Since World War II, the age of maximum arrests has moved upward
to 21 years from 1946 to 1950 inclusive [FEDEAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
UxnoM CRIME REPORTS 116 (1946) ; Id. at 117 (1947) ; Id. at 119 (1948);

Id. at 115 (1949) ; Id. at 109 (1950)], then to 23 in 1951 [Id. at 108 (1951)],
and finally to 24 in 1952 and 1953 [Id. at 113 (1952) ; Id. at 110 (1953)]. In
the pre-war years, the maximum arrests were generally at age 19, as it was
from 1932 to 1941 inclusive, except from 1935 to 1938 when arrests for ages
21, 22 and 23 exceeded those for age 19 [Id. at 204 (1941); Id. at 116 (1946)].
During wartime mobilization of draft-age youth, this age tumbled to 18 for

1942 and 1943 [Id. at 116 (1946)].
6 'The age of maximum criminality lies . . . in the young-adult period
of life. This maximum is not clearly defined, for delinquency or criminality
increases from the age of ten to about nineteen, where it remains nearly constant until the age of twenty-seven, after which it decreases sharply with
advancing age." GLUECK, CRIME AND JUsTIcE 175 (1936).
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in the state.7 It is not surprising that crime culminates on
the threshold of manhood. Adolescence is a period of critical
growth. The greatest change in weight, for example, occurs
in boys between the ages of 16 and 17. During adolescence
comes the crises of puberty when well-known somatic changes
are closely connected with psychological ones. Adolescence
is the period of the functional crises of dispersion and release
from family guardianship toward the synthetic substitute of
neighborhood crowd and gang. Adolescence is also the time
of sharpest contrast between economic inferiority, on one
hand, and number and intensity of desires on the other. Consequently all of these crises make adolescence the period of
greatest want because the teenager has so many things to
long for and so few means to attain them. Chivalrous disdain for caution, characteristic of the youthful personality,
is one reason for the great number of arrests in this age
group. Another is the lack of necessary modus operandi to
commit crimes more likely to escape detection.
Such over-representation of youth in the picture of
major aggressive crime indicates that drastic modification of
treatment of youthful offenders from a punitive method to a
non-punitive one may be tantamount to making inoperative
our entire criminal code.
SHOULD PUNISHMENT BE ABOLISHED?

The first major problem posed by youthful offenders is
whether or not punitive treatment should be abandoned entirely, and if not, under what circumstances it ought to be
employed. Consider the case of Billy A," standing as well as
he could on a crippled foot before the bar awaiting the word
of the sentencing judge. Billy had just pleaded guilty to
burglary-entering a dwelling by a second story window.
The probation officer's pre-sentence report described Billy's
loneliness and relentless search for companionship in the
7 See

1955 LEG. Doc. No. 45,

REPORT,

N.Y.

TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON

(1955).
8 See Coulson, Little Donald Took an Axe, 196

THE COURTS 81

1948).

HARPERS

385, 387 (May

1955 ] REFORM OF JUVENILE OFFENDER LAWS

233

city's barrooms and poolhalls. This was his first appearance
in court although it appeared that he had committed seven
burglaries. A psychologist who spoke with Billy reported
that this was a pointed illustration of over-compensation.
Billy A had committed burglaries to prove to himself that his
lameness was no handicap. He had entered second story windows to convince himself that he was as agile as the next
fellow.
Should Billy A be sentenced to prison? Our first humanitarian impulse wells up with an emphatic NO. But Billy A
actually received a long term of imprisonment. He happened
to be 42 years of age. Had Billy been 16 there is no question
that every consideration consistent with lenient treatment
would have been indulged in his behalf.
Ought chronological age separate those who are to be
punished from those who are to be treated leniently for identical criminal behavior? If, of course, youthful offenders
are a special kind of animal who neither seek pleasure nor
avoid pain, then, of course, the threat of punishment posed
by any criminal code cannot influence their behavior. But
if, as may more likely be the case, young persons are capable
of being intimidated and deterred by punishment and threat
of punishment, then an exclusively non-punitive program of
treatment for them must be justified on grounds other than
that the punitive program can have no effect.
There are several serious defects in any system of treatment of young offenders that is exclusively of the painless
type. Consider the case of Billy B. He made the untimely
error of stealing his fourth automobile a month after his 19th
birthday. Previously he reposed in the status of youthful
offender and had grown accustomed to psychological tests
and sociological treatment each time he had manifested an
uncontrolled preference for hardtop convertibles. His environment had been unfortunate. His father deserted the
family many years before. Billy B had come to regard this
as a more perfect defense against punitive treatment than a
combination of insanity, self-defense and duress. Now, as he
faced the bar for the fourth time, he naturally expected the
same effect to follow the same cause. Imagine his amazement
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when the judge sentenced him to the penitentiary. "I didn't
think that stealing a car was that serious," was the logical
comment of Billy B.
Certainly, one consequence of abolishing punitive treatment for young offenders is to deprive the criminal law of its
efficacy as an instrument of moral education. Billy C, 14
years old, has habitually refused to attend classes at junior
high school and has just broken a neighbor's window with his
baseball. Billy C may be adjudged a juvenile delinquent and
is properly eligible for rehabilitative treatment. His neighborhood pal, Billy D, also 14 years old, has just eviscerated
his grandmother. Strangely enough, Billy D acquires no
more prestige in the rankings and gradations of our current
criminal code than the petty truant. Billy D earns no more
impressive status than juvenile delinquent and is entitled to
no richer perquisites than the lenient rehabilitative treatment
accorded to Billy C. Making treatment of all criminal behavior of young offenders, regardless of its seriousness or
triviality, depend solely upon the individual need of the
offender for rehabilitation may well lead our impressionable
young community to conclude that fracturing someone's skull
is no more immoral than fracturing his bedroom window.
Yet common considerations of humanity make clear that
the community will simply not stand for drastic punishment
of young law-breakers regardless of the seriousness of their
crimes. To attempt to inflict mandatory penalties upon them
in the same way as upon adults would nullify the possibility
of any treatment at all. There are compelling considerations,
not merely humanitarian, that justify at least the experiment
of rehabilitative treatment for young offenders. Youth is
primarily a period of adjustment. Adjustment demands an
organism in the stage of formative flexibilities. The character of any person, adolescent or adult, is the sum total of
his potentialities for good and evil. In the case of the young
offender, it may well be that he has prematurely realized all
of his potentialities for evil and has yet to develop the counteracting ones for good. If so, a program of treatment that
provides maximum opportunity for fruition of undeveloped
potentialities for good is likely in the long run to prevent
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recurrence of delinquent behavior. At the same time a program of punitive treatment might suppress and inhibit not
only the evil but also the good potentialities and lead to
abortive growth of a dangerous and embittered personality
more likely than ever to commit crime.
If punishment should not be totally abolished in treatment of young offenders, under what circumstances should
it be used? Choice between subjecting an offender to punitive or non-punitive reformative treatment involves at the
outset the balancing of advantages and disadvantages of one
method against those of the other. And this must be done in
the light of factors peculiar to each case, favorable or unfavorable to mitigation or severity. How seriously undesirable was
the behavior? Garroting a teammate in a playground is behavior more eligible for punishment than purloining his
catcher's mitt. What does the criminal behavior itself indicate about the actor's character: Were his motives good or
bad? Were his means of committing the crime unnecessarily
dangerous and cruel, or not? Did he act on slight or great
provocation? What does the history of the actor himself indicate about his character: Does his past life indicate bad
habits or good ones? Can his behavior be attributed to unusually disadvantaged surroundings, or was his environment
quite usual? Was the youth's reaction to his crime a sensitive or calloused one? Can some well-defined mental or
physical disorder, temporary and remediable, account for
his criminal behavior, or is there no genuine psychopathic
condition?
Obviously, there is no calculus known to a legislator that
will make possible any advance statutory chart prescribing a
precise remedy based upon combinations of these symptoms.
In the present state of knowledge, determination of the sort
of treatment, punitive or non-punitive, can rationally be left
only to the enlightened discretion of judge or administrator.
Indeed, reform in sentencing adult offenders has proceeded
in the direction of increasing the discretion of the criminal
court judge. Only a handful out of thousands of crimes defined in penal codes have a legislatively prescribed minimum
punishment. The most that the legislature now undertakes
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in advance with respect to treatment of adult offenders is to
prescribe maximum treatment.
UNIFICATION OF PROCEDURE AND PERSONNEL

The second major problem presented by young offenders
is the administrative one of organizing personnel and procedures most efficaciously to accomplish the ends of whatever
treatment is prescribed. Almost every state has achieved a
separate juvenile court, with jurisdiction over offenders up to
16 or 18, except (in some states) in cases of crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment. The current need concerns the forgotten adolescent above the upper limits of
juvenile court jurisdiction. Unification of procedures and
personnel affecting the older adolescent offender might well
take place in a single youth or adolescent court. Its jurisdiction would cover crimes committed by youths between 16,
or 18, and 21, with the same exceptions and procedures that
prevail in children's and juvenile courts.
In one jurisdiction, New York for example, there may
be as many as four separate courts in a single county with
independent probation and guidance services that are authorized to dispose of a single case involving an older adolescent offender. Throughout the state there are over 3,000
police justices and 60 city courts that have jurisdiction over
criminal offenses by youths over 16 in addition to the county
and supreme court. One advantage of centralizing the disposition of cases involving older adolescents in a single court
with a territorial division in each county would be the assurance of uniform results in equal cases. The blindfolded
depiction of Justice is to guarantee impartiality, not lack of
discernment. When identical offenses involving materially
similar offenders have widely diverse dispositions depending
on the particular courthouse in which the determination is
made, then equal justice is at an end. By confining cases of
older youths in a single court, undistracted study would be
possible to ascertain whether the treatment prescribed is
actually curing the patient or making him more violently ill.
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At the same time court jurisdiction and procedure is
being unified and centralized on the county level, probation,
parole and case work ought to be integrated and decentralized to the neighborhood level. Most cases of older adolescent
offenders will be relegated to probationary oversight, if not
because this may be the most efficacious treatment in a particular case, then because it is the most economic and often
the only possible treatment when institutional facilities are
overcrowded. What reform can be achieved by an overburdened case worker stationed many miles from the neighborhood scene on the basis of a semi-monthly interview? A
more workable arrangement would begin at the grass roots
level. A youth officer stationed in each neighborhood, precinct or ward would assume responsibility for all young
persons in conflict with the law whether on probation, parole
or some attenuated form of admonishment.
Much, of course, in this prolegomenon to reform is made
to depend upon the wisdom, devotion, zeal and kindliness of
the administrators of the law rather than upon the blackletter text of statutes. It may well be, as Chesterton observed, that the ". .. horrible thing about all legal officials,
even the best . . . about all judges, magistrates, barristers,

detectives and policemen, is not that they are wicked (some
of them are good), not that they are stupid (some of them
are quite intelligent), it is simply that they have got used to
it." 9 The remedy for callousness bred by getting used to injustice is not new laws. If this situation can be changed
at all, it will be done by a constantly awakened community consciousness directed at preventing crime in the
neighborhood.

"Quoted by Circuit Judge Frank in an address before the Criminal Law
Section of the American Bar Association, August 26, 1953. See Frank, Today's
Problems in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 15 F.R.D. 93, 103.

